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UNPACKING THE DIRTBOX: 
CONFRONTING CELL PHONE LOCATION 
TRACKING WITH THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
Abstract: Surveillance technology has raced ahead of the Fourth Amendment, 
forcing courts to confront high-tech intrusions with rusty jurisprudence. The 
Dirtbox, an airborne cell-site simulator, allows the government to sweep entire 
cities and intercept individuals’ cell phone location information without rely-
ing on cooperative intermediaries. This Note argues that the government’s use 
of the Dirtbox and other cell-site simulators amounts to a Fourth Amendment 
search because it may pinpoint individuals within a constitutionally protected 
space. Although the Department of Justice issued policy guidelines requiring 
its agents to obtain a search warrant before using this device, this narrow and 
unenforceable protocol fails to adequately regulate the rising use of cell phone 
tracking devices. Until the U.S. Supreme Court accepts the opportunity to 
modernize the Fourth Amendment, Congress should enact legislation requir-
ing all law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant before using the Dirtbox or 
other cell-site simulators. 
INTRODUCTION 
Anaheim, a small city in Southern California, is home to 350,000 resi-
dents, Disneyland, and an arsenal of military-grade spy equipment.1 One of 
the devices used by the Anaheim Police Department is the Dirtbox, a plane-
mounted surveillance system that impersonates a cell phone tower and 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Matthew Cagle, Documents Reveal Anaheim, CA Has Surprisingly Robust Surveillance Arse-
nal for Small City, AM. C.L. UNION: FREE FUTURE (Jan. 27, 2016, 6:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org
/blog/free-future/documents-reveal-anaheim-ca-has-surprisingly-robust-surveillance-arsenal-small-
city [https://perma.cc/3S4S-6PSC] (describing how local law enforcement in Anaheim has spent 
nearly a decade developing an inventory of powerful cell phone location monitoring technology); 
see Matt Ferner, Anaheim Cops Have Had a Massive Spy Program for Years, HUFFINGTON POST 
POL. (Jan. 28, 2016, 6:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/anaheim-cops-spy-program_
us_56aa5ac3e4b0d82286d53737 [http://perma.cc/5A3N-XJWE] (noting that the police in Ana-
heim are using surveillance equipment thought to have only been used by the federal government 
and in larger cities). Documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union of California 
reveal that Anaheim law enforcement use at least three types of surveillance equipment. Ferner, 
supra. In 2009, Anaheim used a federal grant to purchase the Dirtbox, an airborne device capable 
of collecting information from thousands of cell phones. Id. Two years later, using a combination 
of federal grant money and local funds, Anaheim purchased the Stingray, a non-airborne Dirtbox. 
Id. Finally, in 2013, Anaheim acquired the Jugular, a hand-held monitoring device designed for 
covert location interception of cell phones within buildings. Id. 
732 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:731 
tricks targeted mobile phones into revealing their location within a ten-foot 
accuracy.2 
Cell phone location tracking raises substantial privacy concerns and 
thus implicates the Fourth Amendment.3 The Fourth Amendment guards 
against government encroachment on individuals’ privacy, but its protec-
tions are not triggered unless a “search” has occurred.4 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has determined that a search occurs when the government violates an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.5 Thus, if an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her cell phone location infor-
mation, the government must obtain a warrant before performing Dirtbox 
surveillance.6 Courts and scholars are divided, however, as to whether peo-
ple have a reasonable expectation of privacy in cellular location data and as 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Kim Zetter, California Police Used Stingrays in Planes to Spy on Phones, WIRED ( Jan. 27, 
2016, 6:28 PM), http://www.wired.com/2016/01/california-police-used-stingrays-in-planes-to-spy-
on-phones/ [https://perma.cc/X27G-EA2J] (discussing how the Anaheim Police Department has 
owned the Dirtbox since 2009); see Devlin Barrett, Americans’ Cellphones Targeted in Secret U.S. 
Spy Program, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-cellphones-
targeted-in-secret-u-s-spy-program-1415917533 [https://perma.cc/G78Z-5YMC] (revealing the 
aerial cell phone surveillance program operated by the U.S. Marshals and discussing the techno-
logical capacity of the Dirtbox). The Dirtbox (or DRTbox) is named after its maker, Digital Re-
ceiver Technology Inc., a Maryland-based subsidiary of Boeing that develops wireless surveil-
lance and tracking equipment for the federal government and law enforcement. Barrett, supra; see 
News Release, Boeing, Boeing to Acquire Digital Receiver Technology to Enhance Capabilities in 
Intelligence Market (Nov. 14, 2008), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2008-11-14-Boeing-Boeing-
to-Acquire-Digital-Receiver-Technology-to-Enhance-Capabilities-in-Intelligence-Market [https://
perma.cc/V5LW-DET5]. Secured to the underside of a soaring Cessna, the Dirtbox emits a phony 
signal that causes cell phones to recognize it as the closest cellular tower and transmit their loca-
tion information. See Barrett, supra. 
 3 See Barrett, supra note 2; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable 
searches by the government); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984) (applying the 
Fourth Amendment to location tracking devices); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 
(1983) (same). 
 4 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (regarding the determination of whether 
a search has occurred to be an “antecedent question”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 
136–37 (1984) (noting that the Fourth Amendment only applies to searches and seizures); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects people 
from unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 5 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when the government violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy); see also 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)) (describing the reasonable expectation of privacy as the standard for Fourth Amendment 
protection); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 6 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (noting that, with few exceptions, warrantless searches violate the 
Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (explaining that 
cases of non-physical electronic surveillance are subject to Fourth Amendment analysis under 
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test).  
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to what constitutional limitations, if any, should be placed on Dirtbox sur-
veillance.7 
This Note argues that Dirtbox surveillance amounts to a Fourth 
Amendment search and therefore the government must be required to get a 
warrant before using this technology.8 When the government uses a device 
to determine an individual’s location with sufficient accuracy to pinpoint 
them within a constitutionally protected space, such as the home, the Fourth 
Amendment demands that this search be conducted pursuant to a warrant.9 
Part I explores the foundations of the Fourth Amendment and discusses its 
application to location tracking.10 Part II examines new developments in 
location tracking, including the Dirtbox.11 Part II also outlines the efforts by 
the Department of Justice and various legislatures to regulate the use of the 
Dirtbox and other cell-site simulators.12 Part III argues that the govern-
ment’s use of the Dirtbox and other cell-site simulators amounts to a Fourth 
Amendment search and that the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress must 
provide individuals with greater protection against novel surveillance tech-
niques.13 
                                                                                                                           
7 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 531 (11th Cir.) (holding that the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location records held by his cellular provider, 
which were subject to the third-party doctrine), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); United States 
v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the defendant did not have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his cell phone location information); State v. Tate, 849 N.W. 2d 798, 
805 (Wis. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1166 (2015) (mem.) (noting that the State of Wisconsin 
had conceded that cell site location tracking constitutes a Fourth Amendment search). Further-
more, the source of the location data—whether directly intercepted or obtained from a cellular 
provider—affects the legal analysis. See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing 
the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. 
Tex. 2012) (holding that the pen register statute does not apply to the interception of cell phone 
location data by a Stingray); Brian L. Owsley, Spies in the Skies: Dirtboxes and Airplane Elec-
tronic Surveillance, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 75, 81–82 (2015), http://michiganlaw
review.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/113MichLRevFI75_Owsley.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJL9-
ZKGZ] (arguing that Dirtbox surveillance amounts to a Fourth Amendment search and therefore 
requires a warrant supported by probable cause). 
 8 See infra notes 140–186 and accompanying text. 
 9 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that the acquisition by sense-enhancing technology of 
information about the inside of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); Karo, 468 U.S. 
at 716 (holding that the government is not exempt from the warrant requirement when it uses an 
electronic device to determine whether an item or person is inside of an individual’s home); see 
also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (applying the mosaic theory to location 
tracking). 
 10 See infra notes 1–73 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 74–113 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 114–139 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 140–186 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches by re-
quiring the government to obtain warrants for almost all searches.14 To trig-
ger this protection, however, a court must determine that a search has taken 
place.15 Section A of this Part explores the evolution of the Fourth Amend-
ment.16 Section B examines the Fourth Amendment in the context of loca-
tion monitoring.17 
A. The Fourth Amendment Search, from Places to People 
The definition of search, under the Fourth Amendment, has evolved 
substantially over the past fifty years.18 At the time of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s ratification, a search was best understood as a physical trespass by 
the government on one’s private property.19 In the latter half of the twenti-
                                                                                                                           
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures”); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (applying “an 18th-century guarantee 
against unreasonable searches”); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (explaining 
that the Fourth Amendment does not “guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against 
unreasonable searches and seizures”). Subject to a few exceptions, a search is reasonable only 
when it is conducted pursuant to a warrant. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (citing 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (2006)) (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires 
that searches be reasonable, though not necessarily executed under warrant). But see Katz, 389 
U.S. at 357 (emphasizing that, with a narrow class of exceptions, warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable). Although the Court has recently favored the reasonableness requirement over the 
warrant requirement, scholars continue to debate the precise mandate of the language of the 
Fourth Amendment. Compare Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 547, 736 (1999) (arguing that although history does not clearly support either a 
warrant-preference or a generalized-reasonableness construction, the former is more consonant 
with the framers’ intent), with Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 759 (1994) (arguing that a search need only be reasonable, but not necessarily warrant-
ed, to comply with the Fourth Amendment). When the government obtains evidence in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule allows for suppression of that evidence at trial. 
See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 118 
(2007) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). 
 15 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (regarding the determination of whether a search has occurred to 
be an “antecedent question”); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 136–37 (noting that the Fourth Amendment 
only applies to searches and seizures); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (explaining that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures); see also Widgren v. Maple Grove 
Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing the word “search” as a complex legal term of 
art). 
 16 See infra notes 18–43 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 44–73 and accompanying text. 
 18 Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928) (equating a “search” with a 
physical trespass), with Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353 (concluding that a “search” is violation of an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 19 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 (holding that no Fourth Amendment search had occurred 
when the government conducted wiretapping without physically trespassing on the defendants’ 
property); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 998 (1982) 
(describing how the Fourth Amendment was historically construed as providing property protec-
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eth century, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the scope of the term, con-
sidering a search to occur when the government violates an individual’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.20 Although this new model generally ex-
panded privacy protection, the subsequent third-party doctrine carved out 
swaths of information from the scope of the Fourth Amendment.21 
In 1886, in Boyd v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court provided the 
first interpretation of the term “search.”22 In Boyd, the Court examined pre-
Revolutionary cases to determine that the compelled production of private 
papers constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, analogizing 
forced document production to the physical invasion of one’s home.23 In 
doing so, the Court expressed a clear preference for a liberal interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment.24 
In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States, the Court retreated from its lib-
eral interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Boyd to the physical tres-
pass model of colonial times.25 The Court considered the activities of feder-
al agents who had placed a wiretap on the phone lines of various bootleg-
ging suspects.26 The Court held that no search had occurred because the 
officers never physically trespassed on the defendants’ property.27 
                                                                                                                           
tion). The framers of the Constitution enacted the Fourth Amendment as a direct response to intru-
sive home searches carried out by the British government under broad, unspecified warrants. See 
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965) (noting that the Fourth Amendment arose from the 
colonists’ revulsion against general writs of assistance); Davies, supra note 14 at 724. 
 20 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth the current two-part test 
used to determine whether a search has occurred); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 
40–41 (1988) (holding that the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of garbage bags they placed at the curb); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) 
(holding that the warrantless aerial observation of a homeowner’s yard did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because his expectation of privacy was not reasonable). 
 21 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (laying the foundation of the third-party doctrine); see also Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (applying the third-party doctrine in holding that Fourth 
Amendment protection does not extend to numbers dialed on a telephone); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (applying the third-party doctrine in holding that government acquisition 
of an individual’s bank records does not constitute a search). 
 22 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886). 
 23 Id. (holding that requiring an individual to produce private papers amounts to a Fourth 
Amendment search); see Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Proper-
ty, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 312 (1998) (noting that Boyd marked the 
beginning of the Court defining Fourth Amendment protections as property rights). 
 24 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment must be broadly inter-
preted to avoid constitutional violations); Radin, supra note 19, at 998 (describing the historical 
framing of the Fourth Amendment as protecting property). 
 25 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect tele-
phone communications in the absence of physical trespass). 
 26 Id. at 456–57 (describing how federal prohibition officers discovered the conspiracy by 
affixing wiretaps to the telephone wires of the homes of four of the suspects and the central of-
fice). 
 27 See id. at 457 (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not protect against wiretapping that 
did not involve physical trespass on the property of the defendants). In a dissenting opinion, Justice 
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In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the 
historical, trespass-based interpretation of search and held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects an individual’s privacy interest, not merely their prop-
erty.28 The Court determined that the FBI had carried out an unconstitution-
al search when they attached an electronic eavesdropping device to the out-
side of a public telephone booth from which the defendant, a suspected ille-
gal gambler, had been placing calls.29 Justice Harlan, concurring, set forth a 
two-part test for determining whether a search has taken place.30 Under this 
test, a court may find that a search has occurred only where (1) the defend-
ant exhibited an expectation of privacy, and (2) society is prepared to rec-
ognize that expectation as reasonable.31 This privacy-based analysis has 
survived the test of time and remains determinative of whether Fourth 
Amendment protections apply in a given situation.32 
Although Katz expanded Fourth Amendment safeguards in many ways 
with the privacy-based model, the majority, in one sentence, simultaneously 
gauged out innumerable privacy rights.33 The majority articulated what 
                                                                                                                           
Brandeis criticized the majority’s narrow interpretation of the term search and forecast a reconceptu-
alization of the Fourth Amendment that would come four decades later. See id. at 474–75 (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the essence of the Fourth Amendment is a guarantee of personal pri-
vacy, rather than a protection against physical intrusion); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (holding 
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”). 
 28 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353 (concluding that Fourth Amendment had developed beyond the 
trespass doctrine to provide privacy protection). Although many courts, including the U.S. Su-
preme Court itself, have interpreted Katz as overruling the physical trespass model of Olmstead, 
the Court recently clarified that Katz merely expanded the traditional trespass-based notion of a 
search articulated in Olmstead. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (explaining that the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test from Katz was an addition to, rather than a substitute for, the trespass doc-
trine); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 (noting that the Court no longer required physical trespass to find a 
Fourth Amendment violation); Karo, 468 U.S. at 713 (observing that a physical trespass is not a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for a violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also Katz, 389 
U.S. at 351, 353 (concluding that physical trespass was not a prerequisite of a Fourth Amendment 
violation); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred 
where the government had not conducted a physical trespass). 
 29 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that the government violated the defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and therefore the Fourth Amendment, when it used an electronic eaves-
dropping device to listen to and record his telephone conversation). 
 30 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 31 See id. (setting forth the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 32 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–33 (noting that Justice Harlan’s concurrence articulated what is 
now the test for whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred); see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 
211 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (describing the reasonable expectation 
of privacy as the standard for Fourth Amendment protection); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (applying 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 33 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (explaining that information knowingly exposed to the public 
does not receive Fourth Amendment protection); Erin Smith Dennis, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, 
the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 749 
(2011) (describing how the third-party doctrine curtails Fourth Amendment protection); see also 
Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Ap-
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would later become the most controversial feature of the Fourth Amend-
ment—the third-party doctrine.34 
The Fourth Amendment does not protect information that one know-
ingly exposes to the public.35 Although typically understood as an exception 
to the Fourth Amendment, the third-party doctrine is not a true exception 
because it fits squarely within the two-part Katz test.36 Specifically, third-
party divulgence undermines the second prong of the Katz test, as society is 
not prepared to recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in infor-
mation that one knowingly shares with a third party.37 
In 1976, in United States v. Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated 
the expansive modern approach to the third-party doctrine.38 The Court held 
that it was constitutional for the government to subpoena the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                           
ply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 14–28 (2013) (discussing the application of the third-party doctrine to the 
Internet). 
 34 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009) 
(suggesting that scholars love to hate the third-party doctrine); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 747 (4th ed. 2004) (arguing that one of 
the leading third-party doctrine cases is “dead wrong” and that the Court’s faulty reasoning on the 
third-party doctrine “does great violence to the theory of Fourth Amendment protection which the 
Court had developed in Katz”). 
 35 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (explaining that knowingly exposed information does not receive 
Fourth Amendment protection). The roots of the third-party doctrine trace back to nearly a century 
before Katz to the “plain view doctrine,” which accords no Fourth Amendment protection to ob-
jects visible to an inspecting officer. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877) (holding that 
information exposed on the outside of a parcel of mail is not entitled to Fourth Amendment pro-
tection). 
 36 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 37 See Greg Nojeim, Why the Third-Party Records Doctrine Should Be Revisited, A.B.A. 
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/law_national_security/patriot_
debates2/the_book_online/ch4/ch4_ess10.html [https://perma.cc/GD9W-6CPA] (explaining that a 
divulging party cannot reasonably expect privacy in information shared with third parties because 
they may disclose that information). But see Kerr, supra note 34, at 588 (arguing that the third-
party doctrine operates as a form of consent rather than an application of the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test). 
 38 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; see also LAFAVE, supra note 34, at 744 (noting the opportuni-
ties for law enforcement to conduct surveillance through examination of third-party business rec-
ords are greater then ever before and will continue to grow in the future). In a series of cases on 
undercover informants, the Court held that defendants were not entitled to Fourth Amendment pro-
tection for confidential information that they disclosed to undercover agents. See Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (holding that Fourth Amendment protection did not apply where 
the defendant knowingly divulged confidential information to an undercover agent); see also 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971) (holding that no search had occurred where the 
defendant invited an informant to participate in an incriminating conversation with him); Hoffa v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (same); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207 (1966) 
(same); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (same). The Court anchored these deci-
sions in the assumption of risk theory, a doctrine typically associated with tort law. See DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 108 
(1972) (illustrating the assumption of risk doctrine through its most basic application, namely that 
a person sharing a secret with another assumes the risk of betrayal). 
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bank to obtain his financial records because the defendant had voluntarily 
conveyed that information to the bank.39 The Court stated that the defendant 
had assumed the risk that the bank would share these records with the gov-
ernment.40 
Subsequently, in 1979, in Smith v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the warrantless installation of a pen register, which recorded the 
telephone numbers that the defendant dialed, did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.41 The Court found that the defendant did not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the numbers that he dialed.42 Citing Miller, the 
Court reaffirmed its position that one cannot reasonably expect privacy in 
information voluntarily conveyed to a third party.43 
B. Beepers, GPS, and Locational Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s physical location from 
certain forms of government surveillance.44 Applying Katz’s reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (observing that all of the documents obtained by the government 
contained information that is voluntarily shared with banks and their employees in the normal 
course of business). But see id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (insisting that disclosures to a bank 
are not completely voluntary because one cannot lead a modern life without a bank account). 
 40 Id. at 443 (majority opinion) (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751–52) (invoking the assumption of 
risk doctrine in the context of bank disclosures). The defendant argued that he maintained a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his bank records because he disclosed them to the bank for a limited 
purpose. See id. at 442. The majority, however, insisted that disclosures to third parties, whether for a 
limited purpose or not, fall within the assumption of risk doctrine and are not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 443; see Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. But see Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (contending that disclosures made solely for business purposes should not be subject to 
the assumption of risk doctrine). 
 41 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (majority opinion). 
 42 See id. at 743–44 (noting the Fourth Amendment’s inapplicability to third-party disclo-
sures). 
 43 See id. at 744 (explaining that the defendant had voluntarily conveyed numerical infor-
mation to the phone company, thereby assuming the risk that the company would share the infor-
mation with the police). Since the Court solidified the third-party doctrine in Miller and Smith, cir-
cuit courts have split over its application to modern technology. See id. at 743 (applying the third-
party doctrine to dialed telephone numbers); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (applying the third-party 
doctrine to bank records). Compare United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(declining to extend the third-party doctrine to the content of email intended for a recipient), with 
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742) (ap-
plying the third-party doctrine to routing data that the internet service provider required in order to 
transmit information). The third-party doctrine extends beyond bank records and dialed digits. See 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (holding that police had not conducted a search when they inspected 
the contents of the defendants’ garbage bags, which were conveyed to them by the third-party 
trash collector). But see State v. Galloway, 198 P.3d 383, 387 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that 
police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they looked through garbage before it could 
be gathered by the trash collector). 
 44 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (holding that the government conducted a Fourth Amendment 
search when it attached a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracker to a target’s vehicle and 
collected information about the vehicle’s movements); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that the use 
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expectation of privacy analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a class 
of monitoring activities that amount to a search and must be conducted pur-
suant to a warrant.45 
In a pair of decisions on government tracking through beepers, the U.S. 
Supreme Court established that an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in location while inside a private residence, but not while traveling on 
public roads.46 Although these two cases involved now-obsolete technology, 
the underlying principles continue to inform judicial treatment of location 
monitoring by the government.47 
In 1983, in United States v. Knotts, the Court held that a person does 
not have a reasonable expectation of locational privacy while traveling on 
public roads.48 The Court considered whether the government violated the 
Fourth Amendment by using a beeper to track the location of a suspected 
drug manufacturer’s vehicle as he drove on public roads to a secluded cab-
in.49 According to the Court, the beeper had merely augmented the senses of 
the police, as they could have obtained the same evidence through visual 
                                                                                                                           
of sense-enhancing technology to obtain information about the interior of a home that could only 
have been obtained through physical intrusion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search). 
 45 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 716 (holding that the government implicates the Fourth Amendment 
by using an electronic tracking device to determine if a person or object is located within a consti-
tutionally protected space); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting 
that even short-term monitoring raises substantial privacy concerns); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 
(Alito, J., concurring) (expressing concern about long-term location monitoring); Dennis J. 
Braithwaite & Allison L. Eiselen, Nowhere to Hide? An Approach to Protecting Reasonable Ex-
pectations of Privacy in Cell Phone Location Data Through the Warrant Requirement, 38 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 287, 308 (2014) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether the 
acquisition of cell-site location information amounts to a Fourth Amendment search). 
 46 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 716; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 47 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54 (discussing the applicability of Knotts and Karo but ulti-
mately distinguishing them based on their facts). Before relying on satellites and cell phones, law 
enforcement agents tracked the location of suspects using a beeper, a small radio transmitter that 
emits signals and provides directional information. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277 (describing a 
beeper as a battery-operated radio device that transmits signals to a receiver); Jerry L. Dowling, 
“Bumper Beepers” and the Fourth Amendment, 13 CRIM. L. BULL. 266, 266 (1977). Beepers are 
“directional finders” because they provide information about the relative direction of the subject 
being tracked, but not its precise location. See Brief of Center for Democracy & Technology et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 15–18, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259) [herein-
after Amicus Brief in Support of Respondent] (explaining that beepers provide only rough approx-
imations of the direction and distance of the vehicle relative to the location of the receiver). Be-
cause neither the beeper nor its receiver can store location information, the utility of this device is 
limited to real-time surveillance. Dowling, supra, at 269 (explaining that because beepers are lim-
ited to real-time monitoring, they are used to supplement visual surveillance by filling in a gap in 
visual contact). 
 48 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (holding that an individual traveling in a vehicle on public roads 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements). 
 49 Id. at 277. 
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surveillance.50 Because the police had ceased beeper monitoring upon the 
defendant’s arrival at the cabin, the Court was not confronted with the 
weighty Fourth Amendment implications of privacy within the home.51 
The following year, in United States v. Karo, the Court was squarely 
presented with the question left open by Knotts: does warrantless beeper 
surveillance violate the Fourth Amendment when it is carried out in a pri-
vate residence?52 The Court answered in the affirmative.53 Agents of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration placed a beeper in a can of ether that the 
defendant had planned to use to manufacture drugs.54 Using the beeper, the 
agents tracked the whereabouts of the can as the defendant and his associ-
ates moved it between various houses and storage facilities.55 Distinguish-
ing this case from Knotts, the Court held that the use of a tracking device 
within a home constitutes a search and is therefore subject to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.56 The Court decided both Knotts and 
Karo under Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test, affirming that the 
historical sanctity of the home would not be eroded by novel tracking tech-
nology.57 
In 2001, in Kyllo v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
use of sense-enhancing technology to obtain information about the interior 
of a home that could only have been accessed through physical intrusion 
constitutes a search, at least where such technology is not in general public 
use.58 Suspecting that the defendant was growing marijuana in his Oregon 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 282 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police from utilizing sen-
sory enhancement devices). 
 51 Id. at 284–85 (noting that there was no evidence to indicate that the beeper device had been 
used after the defendant arrived at the residence); see Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations 
of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 907, 957 (1997) (observing that the home receives the strongest Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of all places); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (noting the historical 
sanctity of the home). 
 52 Karo, 468 U.S. at 707. 
 53 Id. at 714. 
 54 Id. at 708. 
 55 Id. at 708–09, 714 (describing how law enforcement used the beeper to locate the ether in a 
specific house). 
 56 Id. at 716 (rejecting the notion that the government should be able to use an electronic 
device to determine if somebody or something is inside an individual’s home at a certain time 
without being subjected to Fourth Amendment constraints); see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (holding 
that one cannot have a reasonable expectation of locational privacy while traveling in a vehicle on 
public roads). 
 57 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (holding that monitoring an individual’s location within a home 
violates reasonable privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 
(holding that tracking an individual’s travel on public roads does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment because one cannot reasonably expect such movement to be private); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 58 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
2016] Dirtbox, Cell Phone Location Tracking, and the Fourth Amendment 741 
residence, federal agents used a thermal imager to determine that a portion 
of the house was substantially warmer than the rest of the house and neigh-
boring homes.59 Honoring the deep-rooted inviolability of the home, the 
Court held that the government had infringed the defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.60 Central to the Court’s decision was its concern that 
technological innovation would allow law enforcement to strip away indi-
viduals’ Fourth Amendment right to privacy.61 
In 2012, in United States v. Jones, the Court revisited the issue of 
beeper surveillance, but left the Knotts-Karo public travel framework undis-
turbed by anchoring its decision in a physical trespass theory.62 Law en-
forcement, suspecting that the defendant was engaged in narcotics traffick-
ing, affixed an electronic GPS tracking device to the bottom of an automo-
bile registered to the defendant’s wife.63 Over the next twenty-eight days, 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See id. at 30 (describing how the thermal scan of the defendant’s home revealed a higher 
temperature on the roof and outer wall than the rest of the home). Based on these thermal scans 
and other evidence, a judge issued a search warrant of the defendant’s home, which was found to 
contain a substantial marijuana growing operation. See id. (noting that the judge issued a warrant 
based on the thermal imaging, utility bills, and tips from informants). 
 60 See id. at 34–35 (discussing the historical sanctity of the home before concluding that the 
use of a thermal imager amounted to a Fourth Amendment search); see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 
590 (insisting that the Fourth Amendment provides rigid protection against home intrusions); 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (describing how privacy within the home 
stands at the core of the Fourth Amendment); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 58 
(2008) (tracing the sanctity of the home back to antiquity). 
 61 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–36 (rejecting a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment that would allow law enforcement to use new technology to discern activity within the 
home). The Court acknowledged the limitations of the thermal imager used by the agents, but 
recognized it was necessary to craft an approach that would protect against encroachments carried 
out by more sophisticated devices. See id. at 36 (noting that, despite the relatively unsophisticated 
device used in this case, the Court needed to adopt a rule in anticipation of more advanced tech-
nology in the future). 
 62 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (holding that a Fourth Amendment search had occurred where 
the government had physically trespassed on an individual’s property to obtain information); Ste-
ven I. Friedland, Riley v. California and the Stickiness Principle, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 121, 
132 (2016) (observing that Jones offered the Court an opportunity to modernize the Katz doctrine 
to account for novel tracking technology but the Court instead retreated to the physical trespass 
model of the Fourth Amendment). 
 63 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. Originally developed for the military, GPS technology provides 
law enforcement with location tracking that is far more sophisticated than directional information 
from beepers. See Amicus Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 47, at 16–22. Relying on a 
constellation of satellites, GPS broadcasts three-dimensional navigation data to anybody on Earth 
with a GPS receiver. Id. at 7 (describing how the receiver uses satellite data to determine the re-
ceiver’s location). Beyond its improved accuracy over beepers, GPS is entirely automated—it does 
not require that an officer physically pursue a suspect. Id. at 16–17, 21 (noting that GPS conducts 
automatic data collection and does not need to be monitored by a human in real time); see GPS 
Accuracy, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/performance/accuracy/ [https://perma.cc/
BF88-STN6] (describing how a high-quality GPS receiver can provide location information that is 
accurate within 3.5 meters). Finally, GPS data is not limited to real-time, but can be recorded over a 
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the government tracked the movements of the vehicle, ultimately amassing 
over 2000 pages of location data.64 
Relying on the trespass model, the Court held that the government had 
conducted an unconstitutional search.65 Writing for the majority, Justice Scal-
ia focused on the text of the Fourth Amendment, as well as its history, and 
declined the opportunity to modernize the framework.66 Justice Scalia first fit 
the defendant’s car within the enumerated spheres protected under the Fourth 
Amendment, asserting that “a vehicle is an ‘effect.’”67 He then concluded that 
the government’s physical attachment of the tracking device to the underside 
of the defendant’s vehicle and subsequent monitoring amounted to a Fourth 
Amendment search.68 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito authored opinions, concurring with the 
majority’s result but expressing a preference for the privacy-based “mosaic 
theory” over the resurrection of the trespass model, which has limited ap-
plicability to twenty-first-century technology.69 The mosaic theory consid-
ers prolonged surveillance to amount to a search because it reveals a com-
                                                                                                                           
prolonged period. Amicus Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 47 at 16–17 (noting that 
GPS allows for twenty-four-hour, long-term location tracking and uses few resources). 
 64 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. Using satellites, the device communicated to the government 
the vehicle’s location within fifty to one hundred feet. See id. 
 65 See id. at 949; see also Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in 
a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (2012) (noting that the physical trespass in Jones allowed the case to be decided 
without reliance on Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 66 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (holding that the physical intrusion of the GPS device and its 
subsequent data collection would have been considered a search under the original interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting that the physical trespass doc-
trine sets a floor to Fourth Amendment protection). 
 67 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (declaring that a vehicle counts as an “effect” under the Fourth 
Amendment); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”). 
 68 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (holding that the government conducted a search by installing a 
GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle and subsequently using it to monitor the movements of the 
vehicle). The Court distinguishes the unconstitutional search in Jones from the similar, yet consti-
tutional, search in Knotts using a theory of consent by the owner. See id. at 952 (noting that the 
search in Knotts implicated the reasonable expectation of privacy test but not the trespass theory); 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278–79 (describing how officers installed a tracking device inside the chemi-
cal container with the consent of its then-owner). Although the vehicle in Jones was registered to 
the defendant’s wife, the Court explains that he was the exclusive driver, which bestowed upon 
him the property rights of a bailee and accorded Fourth Amendment protection to the automobile. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2. 
 69 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing a preference for re-
solving the case under the reasonable expectation of privacy test and considering the implications 
of prolonged surveillance, including government knowledge of one’s political beliefs, religious 
practices, and sexual habits); id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the Court’s reliance on 
the trespass doctrine would present difficult issues in cases involving electronic surveillance). 
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plete and intimate picture of a person’s life.70 Notably, Jones shows that the 
mosaic theory has won the support of five Justices.71 Justice Sotomayor 
took a firmer stand against government intrusions than the majority, sug-
gesting that the Court consider abandoning the third-party doctrine and ar-
guing that surveillance also implicates the First Amendment.72 Ultimately, 
because the mosaic theory is not law and the Jones majority rested its deci-
sion on the physical trespass model, the Fourth Amendment continues to 
provide little guidance on the increasingly pervasive non-attachment-based 
location monitoring.73 
II. TRACKING TECHNOLOGY RACES AHEAD OF THE LAW 
This Part explores government acquisition of cell phone location infor-
mation through third-party cooperation and direct interception, and describes 
efforts by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and various state legisla-
tures to regulate the Dirtbox and other cell-site simulators.74 Section A de-
                                                                                                                           
 70 See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (describing how individual activities, although 
trivial when viewed in isolation, are far more telling when observed in context); United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that prolonged surveillance may reveal a 
complete picture of an individual’s life), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. The mosaic 
theory represents a departure from the traditional application of the Fourth Amendment, which 
requires a court to scrutinize each government act individually. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315 (2012) (observing that courts de-
termine whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred by analyzing a particular government 
action in isolation). In contrast, a court employing the mosaic doctrine examines a collection of 
government actions over time as one potential “search.” See id. at 320 (describing how a mosaic 
theory analysis considers a series of government acts together, rather than examining them in 
isolation). 
 71 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concur-
ring); see also Kerr, supra note 70, at 320–21 (noting that Maynard and Jones suggest that a ma-
jority of the Court is prepared to embrace the mosaic theory); Slobogin, supra note 65, at 7 (ob-
serving that, as of 2012, five Justices were ready to abandon the connection between physical 
trespass and the Fourth Amendment). Despite the recent traction that it has gained, the mosaic theo-
ry is not without its critics. See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentel-
le, J., dissenting) (rejecting the mosaic theory), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 945; see also Kerr, supra note 70, 
at 346 (expressing concern about the mosaic theory and advocating for its rejection by courts). 
 72 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court 
reconsider the fundamental premise underlying the third-party doctrine, which is “ill suited to the 
digital age” and warning that awareness of government monitoring chills First Amendment free-
doms); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689 (1978) (defining the “chilling effect” as an act of deterrence that causes 
people to refrain from engaging in activities for fear of punishment); Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Sur-
veillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 747 (2008) (arguing that relational surveillance by the government 
threatens not only individual privacy, but also First Amendment rights to freedom of association 
and assembly). 
 73 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (explaining that cases of non-physical electronic surveillance 
remain subject to analysis under Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 74 See infra notes 78–139 and accompanying text. 
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scribes cell-site location information.75 Section B examines the use of cell-
site simulators, such as the Dirtbox, by law enforcement.76 Section C explores 
attempts to regulate the Dirtbox by the Department of Justice and legisla-
tures.77 
A. Cell-Site Location Information 
As the availability and sophistication of location tracking technology 
has surged, so has its use by law enforcement.78 Radio-frequency enabled 
trackers were once a valuable tool for police officers, but satellite-based 
technology, such as GPS devices, has rendered radio “beepers” obsolete.79 
GPS devices remain a popular option for location tracking, but this attach-
ment-based technology presents practical and legal obstacles.80 Law en-
forcement is increasingly turning to cell phone tracking as an appealing al-
ternative to attachment-based tracking devices.81  
                                                                                                                           
 75 See infra notes 78–94 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 95–113 and accompanying text. 
 77 See infra notes 114–139 and accompanying text. 
 78 See Eric Lichtblau, Police Are Using Phone Tracking as a Routine Tool, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/police-tracking-of-cellphones-raises-privacy-
fears.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RR56-WQ89] (revealing that cell phone tracking has gone from 
a national security measure to an everyday tool for local law enforcement, with little or no judicial 
oversight); Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Sealed Court Files Obscure Rise in Electronic Surveil-
lance, WALL STREET J. (June 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sealed-court-files-obscure-
rise-in-electronic-surveillance-1401761770 [https://perma.cc/3AUJ-78MN] (describing how law 
enforcement requests in federal courts for location data and electronic tracking have increased 
substantially over the past decade); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) 
(noting the recent development of novel location tracking technology). 
 79 See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 440 (2009) (describing beepers as “very primi-
tive tracking device[s]”); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Re-
visiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 694 (2005) (noting that GPS devices are more accurate than 
beepers); Ramya Shah, Note, From Beepers to GPS: Can the Fourth Amendment Keep up with 
Electronic Tracking Technology?, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 285 (noting that beepers 
are smaller than GPS trackers and less sophisticated). 
 80 See Travis Martinez, Using GPS Tracking Devices as Alarms, 8 COMMUNITY POLICING 
DISPATCH, no. 1, Jan. 2015, http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/01-2015/using_gps_as_alarms.asp 
[https://perma.cc/TT6F-J3UZ] (describing how law enforcement has difficulty deploying GPS 
trackers on certain property without the devices being detected); Kim Zetter, Busted! Two New 
Fed GPS Trackers Found on SUV, WIRED (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/11/gps-
tracker-times-two/ [https://perma.cc/8D2X-967T] (telling the story of a California man who dis-
covered and removed two GPS tracking devices that police officers had placed on his car); see 
also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (holding that the warrantless attachment of a GPS receiver to an 
automobile violates the Fourth Amendment). This Note refers to beepers and GPS receivers as 
“attachment-based” tracking devices to distinguish them from the more modern tracking devices 
that do not require physical attachment. 
 81 See Bryan Bender, Cellphone Firms Regularly Give Data to Law Enforcement, BOS. GLOBE, 
(Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/12/09/new-figures-show-growth-
law-enforcement-requests-for-cellphone-data/9o1TZ1xz5VUBButjteO1jL/story.html [https://perma.
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Law enforcement may avoid the inherent problems of attachment-
based tracking by obtaining a suspect’s cell-site location information 
(“CSLI”).82 Every cell phone automatically generates CSLI for its wireless 
service provider (“WSP”) in its normal course of functioning.83 Given the 
numerous cellular towers, or “cell sites,” in a geographic area through 
which a call could be routed, and their varying signal strengths, cell phones 
continually register with the cell site emitting the strongest signal to ensure 
optimal connectivity.84 WSPs maintain a record of this registration, indicat-
ing which of its many cell-sites was pinged and at what time.85 Depending 
                                                                                                                           
cc/2Z2J-FL64] (describing how the largest wireless carriers in the United States now routinely 
provide state and local law enforcement with thousands of records containing customers’ location 
information in furtherance of criminal investigations); Sarah Roberts, Court Says No GPS Track-
ing? How About Cell Phone Tracking?, AM. C.L. UNION: SPEAK FREELY (Apr. 6, 2012), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/court-says-no-gps-tracking-ho
w-about-cell-phone [https://perma.cc/D5YB-8PFE] (describing how after warrantless GPS sur-
veillance failed to pass constitutional muster, the government has turned to cell phone monitoring 
to obtain individuals’ location information). 
 82 M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2007) 
(noting that a great advantage of cell phone tracking is law enforcement’s ability to circumvent 
legal and practical hurdles that are often associated with the physical installation of a tracking 
device). With 90% of American adults using cell phones, law enforcement can track the majority 
of the population without planting any external devices. See Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ 
[https://perma.cc/57Q6-NSUD]. Also, whereas GPS receivers are typically affixed to automobiles, 
cell phones remain within arm’s length of users throughout the day. See In re U.S. for an Order 
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(observing that many people never stray more than a few feet from their cell phone). 
 83 See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Matt Blaze, Professor, University of Pennsylva-
nia) [hereinafter Blaze Testimony]; Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 705 (2011) (describing how cell 
phones constantly generate registration data, regardless of whether a call is in progress); Robinson 
Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, The ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-location-tracking/400
775/ [http://perma.cc/8AJA-QQVW] (explaining that cell phone users create a trail of cell-site 
location information as they move throughout the day). 
 84 See Blaze Testimony, supra note 83, at 4 (describing the process by which a call is handed 
off seamlessly between base stations when a cell phone is moving); Freiwald, supra note 83, at 
705 (explaining how frequent registration enables cellular service providers to locate the optimal 
tower through which to transfer incoming and outgoing calls); Meyer, supra note 83 (noting that 
cell phones continually register with the closest cellular tower). Regardless of whether a user is 
placing a call, as long as the cell phone is turned on, cell-site registration occurs every seven sec-
onds or whenever the signal grows weak. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device 
with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 85 See Blaze Testimony, supra note 83, at 7; see also COMPUT. CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RETENTION PERIODS OF MAJOR CELLULAR SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 1 (2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/freespeech/retention_periods_of_major_cell
ular_service_providers.pdf [http://perma.cc/BW2L-N8PQ] (showing that most major wireless 
service providers retain CSLI for over a year). 
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on the area of coverage, or “cell sector,” of a cell-site, CSLI can indicate the 
location of a cell phone from anywhere between a few miles to a few me-
ters.86 
CSLI exists in two forms: historical and real-time.87 Historical CSLI 
consists of records stored by a WSP that indicate where a cell phone was 
located in the past.88 Real-time CSLI, on the other hand, refers to the data 
that reveals the current location of a cell phone.89 Notably, real-time CSLI 
may be more accurate than historical CSLI because the former can be en-
hanced through triangulation.90 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Freiwald, supra note 83, at 711 (citing Blaze Testimony, supra note 83, at 25) (noting 
that, in small cell sectors, CSLI can reveal the location of a cell phone with great accuracy). Alt-
hough early cell sectors were quite large, the increased demand for bandwidth has led to signifi-
cantly smaller base stations, some designed to serve specific floors of a building or even an indi-
vidual home). Blaze Testimony, supra note 83, at 8–9. Despite shrinking cell-sites, it is generally 
accepted that CSLI is less accurate than GPS. See The Two Towers, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 6, 
2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21615622-junk-science-putting-innocent-
people-jail-two-towers (noting that juries’ unquestioning reliance on historical CSLI leads to false 
convictions because such location information is significantly less accurate than prosecutors may 
claim). But see Thomas A. O’Malley, Using Historical Cell Site Analysis Evidence in Criminal 
Trials, 59 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 16, 17 (2011) (describing historical CSLI as “reliable, accurate, and 
useful in criminal trials”). Accurate cell phone location information is a federal requirement. See 
47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2012) (setting forth location accuracy requirements for network-based 
cellular devices to assure that law enforcement can find 911 emergency callers). 
 87 See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391–92 (D. Md. 2012), aff’d, 796 F.3d 
332 (4th Cir.), vacated, 624 Fed. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing between historical 
CSLI and real-time CSLI); State v. Perry, 776 S.E.2d 528, 534 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015), review de-
nied, 781 S.E.2d 622 (N.C. 2016) (mem.) (same). 
 88 Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (explaining that historical CSLI “exposes to the govern-
ment only where a suspect was and not where he is”); Perry, 776 S.E.2d at 534 (noting that histor-
ical CSLI indicates where a cell phone was located at a certain time in the past). 
 89 See Perry, 776 S.E.2d at 534 (explaining that real-time CSLI reveals the present location of 
a cell phone); see also Ford v. State, No. PD-1396-14, 2015 WL 8957647, at *10 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Dec. 16, 2015) (distinguishing real-time CSLI from historical CSLI). 
 90 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a 
Certain Cellular Phone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining how the process of 
triangulation can render real-time cell phone location information “with a fair degree of preci-
sion”); see also In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 137 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (observing that the accuracy of CSLI can be significantly enhanced by triangulat-
ing a cell phone’s signal to multiple towers). Because historical CSLI is comprised of location 
data obtained from one tower at a time, it cannot be improved through triangulation, which re-
quires data from multiple towers. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Cell Site Location Info., No. 6:08-6038M-REW, 2009 WL 8231744, at *2 (E.D. Ky. 
Apr. 17, 2009) (noting that triangulation is not possible with historical CSLI, which is derived 
from a single cell site); Interview with Nathan Freed Wessler, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties 
Union (July 1, 2014), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/07/01/is-your-local-police-force-using
-high-tech-tracking-the-top-four-terms-you-need-to-know/ (explaining that real-time CSLI provides 
more precise tracking than historical CSLI because the former can be triangulated). But see Steph-
anie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for 
Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
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The government typically obtains cell phone location data by requesting 
CSLI from a WSP, which poses legal and practical obstacles.91 The patch-
work of statutory authority upon which the government relies to obtain CSLI 
is ill fitted to such technology and leads to inconsistent outcomes across ju-
risdictions.92 Furthermore, the government’s reliance on a third party may 
result in delay or uncooperativeness.93 For these reasons, law enforcement 
has increasingly begun to take matters into their own hands by intercepting 
CSLI, thus avoiding the hindrances of courts and third-party WSPs.94 
                                                                                                                           
117, 128 (2012) (noting that although it is not common practice, some cellular providers routinely 
record triangulated CSLI). 
 91 See Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, AM. C.L. UNION (Mar. 25, 
2013), https://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cell-phone-location-tracking-pub
lic-records-request [http://perma.cc/TQH9-RCJJ] (revealing that out of a survey of approximately 
250 law enforcement agencies, only thirteen did not engage in cell phone tracking); Shira Schoen-
berg, Law Enforcement Agencies Made 1.1 Million Requests for Americans’ Cell Phone Records 
in 2012, U.S. Sen. Ed Markey Finds, MASSLIVE (Dec. 9, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://www.mass
live.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/law_enforcement_agencies_made.html [https://perma.cc/9C59
-42NL]. 
 92 See Transparency Report, AT&T, http://about.att.com/content/csr/home/frequently-requ
ested-info/governance/transparencyreport.html [https://perma.cc/ELL9-S5ET] (offering data from 
2015 on subpoenas, court orders, and search warrants sought by law enforcement to obtain cus-
tomers’ cell phone location information); e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing 
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. (Sealed), 402 
F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005) (“[T]he government contends that the [Stored Communica-
tions Act] authorizes disclosure of historical cell site information and, when combined with the 
Pen/Trap Statute, also authorizes disclosure of real time cell site information.”). Compare United 
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (mem.) (holding 
that the government may obtain historical CSLI pursuant to the Stored Communications Act), with 
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 574–75 (D. Md. 2011) (holding that the government may not 
obtain historical CSLI pursuant to the Stored Communications Act). 
 93 See Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies: State-
ment Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary (2011) (statement of Valerie Caproni, Gen. Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/going-dark-lawful-electronic-surveillance-in-the-face-of-new
-technologies [https://perma.cc/9MCY-9QXX] [hereinafter Going Dark] (describing the increas-
ingly common situation of cell phone providers failing to comply with court orders); see also 
David Kravets, Cell-Tracking Bills Require Info Dump for Missing Persons, WIRED (Oct. 22, 
2009), http://www.wired.com/2009/10/cell-tracking-bills/ [https://perma.cc/C3EU-43YU] (detail-
ing the story of Kelsey Smith, a teenage girl who was kidnapped and killed during the days it took 
law enforcement to obtain her CSLI from Verizon). Apple’s recent refusal to provide the DOJ 
with backdoor access to its iPhone has ignited national debate regarding uncooperative intermedi-
aries, highlighting the challenges of third-party reliance. See Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple 
Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman’s iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/apple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/34GQ-FS2R] (describing the legal dispute and national policy debate that erupt-
ed after Apple refused to circumvent iPhone safeguards and provide the DOJ with access to the 
cell phone belonging to the San Bernardino shooter). 
 94 See generally John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY 
(June 13, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spying-
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B. Stingrays and Dirtboxes: Cutting out the Middle Man  
with Cell-Site Simulators 
Federal, state, and local law enforcement use devices called Stingrays 
to intercept cell phone location information.95 The Stingray, part of a broad-
er class of international mobile subscriber identity (“IMSI”) catchers, mim-
ics a cellular tower and compels all cell phones within range to transmit 
their location data to the device.96 With this data, law enforcement can use 
triangulation to calculate an individual’s precise location.97 Although typi-
cally used to target the location of a single cell phone, Stingrays intercept 
data from every cell phone within range.98 Originally developed for coun-
ter-terrorism, these devices are now routinely used by local law enforce-
ment.99 Despite the widespread use of Stingrays, the federal government has 
resorted to extreme measures to keep them classified.100 
                                                                                                                           
nsa-police/3902809/ [https://perma.cc/2JH2-B22M] (noting that law enforcement is increasingly 
relying on new technology to intercept cell phone location information). 
 95 See Joseph Goldstein, New York Police Are Using Covert Cellphone Trackers, Civil Liberties 
Group Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/nyregion/new-york-
police-dept-cellphone-tracking-stingrays.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LRH5-BUMB] (revealing that 
the New York Police Department has been using Stingrays “as frequently as 200 times a year” since 
2008); Timothy Williams, Covert Electronic Surveillance Prompts Calls for Transparency, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/us/stingray-covert-electronic-
surveillance-prompts-calls-for-transparency.html [http://perma.cc/9RRW-RLSC] (“Law enforce-
ment officials across the United States have become enamored of the StingRay . . . .”); Stingray 
Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-track
ing-devices-whos-got-them [https://perma.cc/TCN4-KKRE] (tracking Stingray use by federal, 
state, and local law enforcement across the country). Harris Corporation, the designer and manu-
facturer of the Stingray, produces variations on this device, which include the Stingray II, Amber-
Jack, KingFish, TriggerFish, and LoggerHead. Jennifer Valentino-Devries, ‘Stingray’ Phone 
Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424053111904194604576583112723197574 [https://perma.cc/JP5P-AGE3]. 
 96 See Goldstein, supra note 95 (describing Stingrays as portable devices that intercept the 
location information of cell phones by imitating cellular towers); Williams, supra note 95 (ex-
plaining how Stingrays mimic cellular towers). 
 97 See Joel Hruska, Stingray, the Fake Cell Phone Tower Cops and Carriers Use to Track Your 
Every Move, EXTREMETECH (June 17, 2014), http://www.extremetech.com/mobile/184597-stingray-
the-fake-cell-phone-tower-cops-and-providers-use-to-track-your-every-move [https://perma.cc/7G9Y-
7QSV] (explaining how law enforcement typically operate this device from within a vehicle, allow-
ing them to discretely obtain cell phone signals from several locations and then triangulate those 
signals to hone in on a suspect’s precise location); Jennifer Valentino-Devries, How ‘Stingray’ Devic-
es Work, WALL STREET J.: DIGITS (Sept. 21, 2011, 10:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/
09/21/how-stingray-devices-work/ [https://perma.cc/GC3D-JDSM] (describing how Stingrays can 
measure cell phone signals and then triangulate them to obtain more precise location information). 
 98 Goldstein, supra note 95 (explaining that although Stingrays are used to locate specific 
individuals, the devices also gather data from other cell phones within range); see Stingray Track-
ing Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 95 (noting that Stingrays gather cell phone location 
information from bystanders). 
 99 See Kelly, supra note 94 (noting that “[a]t least 25 police departments own a Stingray” and 
that “[t]he federal government funds most of the purchases, via anti-terror grants”). Since obtain-
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In November 2014, a news report revealed that the DOJ uses airplane-
mounted IMSI catchers that are far more sophisticated than the Stingray.101 
Named after its manufacturer, Digital Receiver Technology Inc., the 
DRTbox (or “Dirtbox”) also dupes cell phones into transmitting their loca-
tion information to the device by posing as a cellular tower.102 In a surveil-
lance program operated by the U.S. Marshals Service since 2007, Dirtboxes 
are affixed to the underside of small-sized Cessna aircraft, which regularly 
fly over an area covering most of the population of the United States in 
search of criminal suspects.103 The two-foot-square box is humble in size 
relative to the cellular towers it mimics, but it is extremely powerful—in a 
single flight, the Dirtbox intercepts data from tens of thousands of cell 
                                                                                                                           
ing regulatory approval, the Stingray has deviated from its intended and approved usage. See Na-
than Freed Wessler & Nicole Ozer, Documents Suggest Maker of Controversial Surveillance Tool 
Misled the FCC, AM. C.L. UNION: FREE FUTURE (Sept. 17, 2014 10:15AM), https://www.aclu.
org/blog/documents-suggest-maker-controversial-surveillance-tool-misled-fcc [https://perma.cc/
NHF4-6KAP]; see also Email from Tania Hanna, Harris Corp. Emp/, to Bruce Romano (June 24, 
2010), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1303034/fcc-foia-harris-e
mails.pdf [https://perma.cc/828Y-Z94T] (describing the Stingray as a piece of equipment intended 
for emergency use). 
 100 See Nathan Freed Wessler, U.S. Marshals Seize Local Cops’ Cell Phone Tracking Files in 
Extraordinary Attempt to Keep Information from Public, AM. C.L. UNION: FREE FUTURE (June 3, 
2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/us-marshals-seize-local-cops-cell-phone-tracking-files-extraordin
ary-attempt-keep-information [http://perma.cc/LHW9-9EXK] (recounting that as the American 
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) prepared to review Stingray-related Freedom of Information Act 
documents at a local Florida police station, U.S. Marshals arrived and seized all of the docu-
ments); see also Thomas v. State, 127 So. 3d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (describing how 
police officers declined to seek a warrant to avoid revealing information about the device they 
deployed to track the cell phone’s location); Shawn Musgrave, Before They Could Track Cell 
Phone Data, Police Had to Sign a NDA with the FBI, MUCKROCK (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2014/sep/22/they-could-track-cell-phone-data-police-
had-sign-n/ [https://perma.cc/8RYY-RA8Y] (revealing that the FBI requires state and local law 
enforcement to sign a nondisclosure agreement before acquiring a Stingray). 
 101 Barrett, supra note 2 (describing the Dirtbox surveillance program as “more sophisticated 
than anything previously understood about government use of such technology”); Gail Sullivan, 
Report: Secret Government Program Uses Aircraft for Mass Cellphone Surveillance, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/14/report-secret-
government-program-uses-aircraft-for-mass-cellphone-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/2PJH-3MEB] 
(describing the Dirtbox program). The devices are now being used by other federal agencies, as 
well as state and local law enforcement. See Ferner, supra note 1 (noting that the police in Ana-
heim are using surveillance equipment thought to have only been used by the federal government 
and in larger cities). 
 102 Barrett, supra note 2 (describing how the Dirtbox mimics cellular towers, causing cell 
phones to connect to it and transfer their registration information). The Dirtbox acquires this IMSI 
directly, obviating the need for tower-based CSLI. See id. 
 103 Id. (explaining that, for cost reasons, a single flight typically targets multiple suspects); see 
Memorandum, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site Simula-
tor Technology 3 (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [http://perma.
cc/C52N-EHNJ] [hereinafter DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo] (providing guidelines for “use of a cell-
site simulator on an aircraft”). 
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phones.104 After compelling a cell phone to register with the Dirtbox at mul-
tiple points in the sky, the Marshals can use trilateration to determine the 
location of an individual within ten feet.105 
Because it directly intercepts location data, in real-time, and combines 
dragnet capabilities with high-accuracy triangulation, this high-flying im-
poster delivers unique benefits to law enforcement.106 By mounting the 
Dirtbox on an aircraft, the government can quickly and discretely comb 
through thousands of phone numbers in search of persons of interest in an 
urban or suburban area.107 Dirtbox surveillance has many potential uses, 
from foiling criminal acts to assisting search-and-rescue missions in remote 
locations.108 Despite these benefits, the Dirtbox poses significant privacy 
concerns.109 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Barrett, supra note 2. According to people with knowledge of the surveillance program, 
the Dirtbox determines which cell phone registration information belongs to criminal suspects, 
then discards the rest. Id. 
 105 See id. Because it uses trilateration, the Dirtbox obtains more accurate location infor-
mation than single tower historical CSLI. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authoriz-
ing the Disclosure of Cell Site Location Info., No. 6:08-6038M-REW, 2009 WL 8231744, at *2 
(E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2009) (explaining that historical CSLI cannot provide precise location infor-
mation through triangulation because it relies on single-site activation). 
 106 See Barrett, supra note 2 (describing the effectiveness of Dirtbox technology in appre-
hending criminal suspects); DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 1 (noting that cell-site 
simulators further public safety objectives, “[w]hether deployed as part of a fugitive apprehension 
effort, a complex narcotics investigation, or to locate or rescue a kidnapped child”); see also 
Devlin Barrett, CIA Aided Justice Department Secret Program to Spy on U.S. Cellphones, WALL 
STREET J. (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-gave-justice-department-secret-
phone-scanning-technology-1426009924 [http://perma.cc/A8F4-JAUZ] (explaining how Dirtbox 
technology is used to locate criminal suspects in the United States and terror suspects abroad). 
 107 See Jessica Trufant & Patrick Ronan, Quincy Finally Gets Some Answers About Mysteri-
ous Plane, PATRIOT LEDGER (June 1, 2014), http://www.patriotledger.com/article/20140601/News/
140609702 [http://perma.cc/ENX8-4ZBL] (reporting that the government circled Dirtbox-equipped 
Cessnas over Quincy, Massachusetts, in the wake of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing to inves-
tigate a man with suspected ties to the bombing); see also Barrett, supra note 2. 
 108 See Barrett, supra note 2 (noting that this airborne surveillance device “has been effective in 
catching suspected drug dealers and killers”); Michael Isikoff, FBI Tracks Suspects’ Cell Phones 
Without a Warrant, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/fbi-tracks-suspects-
cell-phones-without-warrant-75099 (describing how federal agents used real-time CSLI to track a 
Mexican drug cartel transporting 2200 kilograms of cocaine); see also Lichtblau, supra note 78 
(describing how police in Michigan used real-time CSLI to find a stabbing victim who was in a 
basement hiding from his attacker); Kravets, supra note 93 (detailing the story of Kelsey Smith, a 
teenage girl who was kidnapped and killed during the days it took law enforcement to obtain her 
CSLI from Verizon); Valentino-Devries, supra note 97 (describing how IMSI catchers are used to 
locate criminal suspects and help search-and-rescue teams find missing people). 
 109 See Matt Cagle, Dirtbox Over Disneyland? New Docs Reveal Anaheim’s Cellular Surveil-
lance Arsenal, AM. C.L. UNION OF NORTHERN CAL. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.aclunc.org/
blog/dirtbox-over-disneyland-new-docs-reveal-anaheim-s-cellular-surveillance-arsenal [https://
perma.cc/W3KS-DQMH] (discussing how Dirtbox surveillance in Anaheim, California may affect 
the privacy of millions of residents and visitors); see also Barrett, supra note 2 (quoting Christo-
pher Soghoian, Chief Technologist at the ACLU, as stating: “Maybe it’s worth violating privacy 
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The November 2014 revelation of the U.S. Marshals’ Dirtbox program 
triggered public outcry and calls for transparency.110 Civil liberties groups 
decried the wide-sweeping surveillance as overzealous, questioning its consti-
tutionality and demanding government disclosures.111 Troubled by the priva-
cy concerns posed by the Dirtbox and the DOJ’s silence, various members of 
Congress insisted that the Department disclose specific details regarding this 
location tracking technology.112 Months after the congressional demands, and 
despite DOJ briefings on location tracking technology, the House Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform pressed the DOJ to produce depart-
ment-wide policies concerning cell-site simulation technology.113 
C. Attempts to Rein in the Dirtbox 
On September 3, 2015, the DOJ issued a policy memorandum estab-
lishing guidance for the Department’s use of the Dirtbox and other cell-site 
                                                                                                                           
of hundreds of people to catch a suspect, but is it worth thousands or tens of thousands or hun-
dreds of thousands of peoples’ privacy?”). 
 110 Trevor Timm, First Snowden. Then Tracking You on Wheels. Now Spies on a Plane. Yes, 
Surveillance Is Everywhere, The GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/nov/15/spies-plane-surveillance-us-marshals [https://perma.cc/5UUT-UJ7A] 
(expressing shock at congressional silence on “blatant domestic spying abuse,” which entails 
“spies on a plane, snooping exclusively on Americans, on a massive scale”); see Owsley, supra 
note 7, at 81–82 (arguing that Dirtbox surveillance amounts to a Fourth Amendment search and 
therefore requires a warrant supported by probable cause). 
 111 See Bennett Stein, ACLU Seeks Information About Airborne Cell Phone Snooping, AM. 
C.L. UNION: FREE FUTURE (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:59 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/aclu-
seeks-information-about-airborne-cell-phone-snooping [http://perma.cc/SJ7M-V7VU] (noting 
increasing public resistance towards the government’s use of cell-site simulators); see also Com-
plaint for Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:15-cv-00200 
(D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2015) (seeking expedited records from executive agencies concerning Dirtbox 
data collection); Letter from Nathan Freed Wessler, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to 
Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/baltimore
_surveillance_flight_foia_request.pdf [https://perma.cc/67XS-STLD] (requesting information re-
garding the government’s use of cell-site simulators). 
 112 See Letter from Jon Tester, U.S. Senator of Mont. et al. to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, & Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
(Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1378358-249798493-tester-s-letter-to-
attorney-general.html [https://perma.cc/7FTC-QQT7] (asking that the DOJ provide responses to 
questions regarding the Dirtbox surveillance program); Letter from Edward J. Markey, U.S. Sena-
tor of Mass., to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 14, 2014), http://
www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2014-11-14_DOJ_Surveillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE3P-
94YS] (same); see also Barrett, supra note 2 (stating that an official from the Department of Jus-
tice would not confirm or deny the existence of the Dirtbox program). 
 113 See Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform et 
al. to Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 24, 2015), https://oversight.house. 
gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015-04-24-JEC-EEC-WH-RK-to-Holder-DOJ-stingrays-due-5-
8.pdf [http://perma.cc/J5DH-9M3Q]. 
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simulators (the “DOJ memo”).114 The DOJ memo sets forth background 
information regarding cell-site simulators and outlines procedures for inter-
nal controls and accountability.115 More importantly, the DOJ memo estab-
lishes legal protocols for the use of this technology and the subsequent 
management of data collected.116 Foremost among these protocols is a rule 
that agents obtain a search warrant prior to deploying a cell-site simula-
tor.117 
Under this new policy, a warrant is not required in circumstances that 
are “exigent” or “exceptional.”118 Exigent circumstances exist where the 
needs of law enforcement are so compelling that the search would be objec-
tively reasonable, even without a warrant.119 Under such circumstances, an 
agent is still required to obtain judicial authorization under the pen register 
statute, as well as internal approval.120 Exceptional circumstances permit 
law enforcement to conduct cell-site interception where it is impracticable 
                                                                                                                           
 114 DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103; see Tal Kopan & Josh Gaynor, DOJ Cracks 
Down on Use of Cell-Duping Stingrays, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 3, 2015, 6:13 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2015/09/03/politics/stingrays-cell-site-simulator-justice-department-rules/ [http://perma.cc/
5WC7-RJMN] (describing the DOJ’s new guidelines on cell-site simulators); Ellen Nakashima, Jus-
tice Department: Agencies Need Warrants to Use Cellphone Trackers, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-agencies-will-have-to-
obtain-warrant-before-using-cellphone-surveillance-technology/2015/09/03/08e44b70-5255-11e5-
933e-7d06c647a395_story.html [http://perma.cc/AW4Y-YP5K] (predicting that the guidelines 
announced by Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates will increase transparency); ACLU 
Comment on New Justice Department Guidelines for Secretive Stingray Surveillance Devices, AM. 
C.L. UNION (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-comment-new-justice-department-guide
lines-secretive-stingray-surveillance-devices [https://perma.cc/NS45-KBG5] [hereinafter ACLU 
Comment] (characterizing the guidelines as “a positive first step” but advocating that the DOJ 
close certain loopholes in the policy and extend its applicability to other federal agencies, as well 
as state and local law enforcement). 
 115 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 2 (describing the basic uses and limi-
tations of cell-site simulators, and requiring that the technology be used only by “knowledgeable 
and accountable personnel”). 
 116 See id. at 3–6 (requiring that all data obtained during Dirtbox location tracking be deleted 
as soon as the target cellphone is located, and at least once per day). 
 117 See id. at 3 (“[A]s a matter of policy, law enforcement agencies must now obtain a search 
warrant supported by probable cause and issued pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure . . . .”). The DOJ memo also requires that the use of a cell-site simulator have judicial 
approval under the pen register statute. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012) (requiring that the 
government certify that the information it seeks is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation). For 
all court applications, the DOJ memo requires agents to describe the purpose of the interception and 
the nature of the technology. See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 5. 
 118 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 3–4 (setting forth two exceptions to 
the DOJ’s warrant requirement for the use of cell-site simulators). 
 119 Id. at 3 (setting forth examples of exigent circumstances, including the need to protect 
against serious harm to human life, prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, pursue a fleeing 
criminal, and prevent the escape of a fugitive suspect or convict). 
 120 Id. at 4; see 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (providing for judicial authorization of a pen register or trap 
and trace device upon certification by the government that the information likely to be obtained is 
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation). 
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to obtain a search warrant.121 Agents in these situations must nevertheless 
obtain three levels of internal Department authorization.122 
These guidelines, although robust, are limited in applicability and en-
forceability.123 First, the warrant exceptions cut deeply into the rule.124 Sec-
ond, the policy applies only to agents of the DOJ.125 Finally, the memo sets 
forth nothing more than policy guidance—it creates no rights or binding 
obligations.126  
Reactions to the DOJ policy memo were generally positive, but ques-
tions remained about the carve-outs and limited applicability of the guide-
lines.127 On November 2, 2015, House Representative Jason Chaffetz intro-
duced a bill to expand and codify the DOJ memo.128 Under the proposed 
                                                                                                                           
 121 DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 4 (restricting the use of the exceptional 
circumstances exception to situations in which “the law does not require a search warrant” and 
noting that these circumstances are expected to be “very limited”). 
 122 See id. (requiring agents excused from the warrant rule under exceptional circumstances to 
obtain approval for deployment of a cell-site simulator from executive-level personnel at the DOJ 
headquarters, a U.S. Attorney, and a Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General). 
 123 See id. at 2 n.2, 6. 
 124 See Carrie Johnson, New Cellphone Surveillance Safeguards Imposed on Federal Law En-
forcement, NPR (Sept. 4, 2015, 11:50 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/09/03/
437311545/new-cell-phone-surveillance-safeguards-imposed-on-federal-law-enforcement [https://
perma.cc/X83F-SC7H] (expressing concern that the guidelines leave open a loophole for the war-
rantless use of cell-site simulators in an undefined category of “exceptional circumstances”); DOJ 
Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 3–4. 
 125 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 6 (“This policy applies to all instances 
in which Department components use cell-site simulators in support of other Federal agencies 
and/or State and Local law enforcement agencies.”); see also Johnson, supra note 124 (noting the 
limited applicability of the guidelines). Shortly after the DOJ issued this policy memo, the De-
partment of Homeland Security issued one of its own. See Memorandum from Alejandro N. 
Mayorkas, Deputy Sec., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to Various DHS Components (Oct. 19, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [http://perma.cc/W2YB-9YKU] (setting forth 
policy directives nearly identical to those in the DOJ memo). 
 126 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 2 n.2 (stipulating that the policy serves 
internal management purposes only and “is not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, 
trust, or responsibility, whether substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity” and does 
not “create any right of review in an administrative, judicial, or any other proceeding” (emphasis 
added)). 
 127 See Johnson, supra note 124 (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy, D-VT, as stating: “Today’s 
announcement is a welcome step forward . . . . However, I have serious questions about the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement that are set forth in this new policy, and I will press the Depart-
ment to justify them.”); ACLU Comment, supra note 114 (noting that the policy provides desirable 
protections but that it should go further); DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103. 
 128 Cell-Site Simulator Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposing regulations on 
the use of cell-site simulators by federal agencies, as well as state and local law enforcement); see 
Chaffetz Introduces Legislation to Address Government Use of Cell Site Simulators, U.S. CON-
GRESSMAN JASON CHAFFETZ (Nov. 2, 2015), https://chaffetz.house.gov/press-release/chaffetz-
introduces-legislation-address-government-use-cell-site-simulators [https://perma.cc/39WN-9P9N] 
(announcing Rep. Chaffetz’ introduction of the legislation in response to the abuse of cell-site 
simulators by law enforcement agencies, and asserting that the bill “codifies recent guidance from 
the Department of Justice”); see also Kim Zetter, New Bill Would Make Local and State Law 
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legislation, no government official may use a cell-site simulator without a 
warrant.129 The bill would provide warrant exceptions that largely trace 
those in the DOJ memo, but with additional safeguards.130 Despite the in-
creased protections offered by the bill, it is unlikely to be enacted.131 
States have begun to pass their own legislation to address the use of 
cell-site simulators.132 In 2013, Montana passed a law requiring the gov-
ernment to obtain a warrant prior to using a cell-site simulator.133 Tennes-
see, Utah, Indiana, and Minnesota passed similar laws and set forth a range 
of warrant exceptions.134 More recently, California enacted what was hailed 
                                                                                                                           
Enforcers Get a Warrant to Use Stingrays, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Nov. 6, 2015, 4:55 PM), http://
www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/11/06/stingray_surveillance_technology_new_bill_would
_force_local_state_law_enforcement.html [http://perma.cc/XT7H-HB8B] (noting that the Act was 
introduced to close the loophole in the DOJ policy memo that limits the warrant requirement to 
agents of the DOJ). 
 129 H.R. 3871 (setting forth a general prohibition on the use of cell-site simulators, but noting 
that such prohibition does not apply to “[u]se of a cell-site simulator by a governmental entity 
under a warrant issued under the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure”). Any evidence obtained in violation of the Cell-Site Simulator Act would be inadmissible. Id. 
 130 See id. (waiving the warrant requirement for surveillance (1) under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, (2) under emergency circumstances, or (3) when a warrant cannot be obtained). The 
emergency circumstances are limited to physical danger, a threat to national security, or organized 
criminal conspiracy. Id. Furthermore, under the emergency circumstances exception, the use of a 
cell-site simulator would only be permitted if there were grounds upon which a warrant could be 
issued and if the government official applied for a warrant within forty-eight hours of commenc-
ing surveillance. Id. 
 131 See H.R. 3871: Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/114/hr3871 [http://perma.cc/K44W-D4GS] (predicting a 5% chance that the bill 
becomes enacted). 
 132 Williams, supra note 95 (describing how states are pushing back against the use of cell-site 
simulators by law enforcement); Nationwide Effort Aims to Empower Americans to “Take Control” 
of Their Privacy, AM. C.L. UNION (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/16-states-dc-introduce
-legislation-limit-surveillance-and-protect-student-and-employee-privacy [http://perma.cc/85YU-
LKYF] (describing the announcement of state legislation on location tracking by a coalition of 
legislators and advocacy groups). 
 133 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-110(1)(a) (2015) (providing that “a government entity may not 
obtain the location information of an electronic device without a search warrant issued by a duly 
authorized court”). The Montana statute provides an exception to the warrant requirement in situa-
tions involving stolen devices, an emergency, or informed consent. Id. 
 134 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-12(a) (2015) (prohibiting law enforcement from using 
real-time cellular tracking devices without first obtaining “an order issued by a court based upon a 
finding of probable cause,” unless exigent circumstances exist); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42, subd. 
2(a) (2014) (providing that “a government entity may not obtain the location information of an 
electronic device without a tracking warrant,” except in situations of lost or stolen devices, emer-
gency, or informed consent); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-610(b) (2014) (providing that “no gov-
ernmental entity shall obtain the location information of an electronic device without a search 
warrant issued by a duly authorized court,” except in circumstances of a stolen device, an emer-
gency, affirmative consent, a user posting his location on social media, or exigency); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-23c-102(1)(a), (2)(a) (West 2014) (providing that “a government entity may not obtain 
the location information . . . of an electronic device without a search warrant issued by a court 
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as comprehensive privacy legislation, but which allows law enforcement to 
use cell-site simulators pursuant to a wiretap order.135 
With no clear limits yet from Congress on Dirtbox or Stingray tech-
nology and without guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court as to whether 
CSLI acquisition amounts to a Fourth Amendment search, lower courts are 
split.136 Courts have generally held that the government may acquire histor-
ical CSLI from a wireless service provider without a warrant because such 
information constitutes a business record and falls within the third-party 
doctrine.137 In contrast, courts have been more troubled by the government 
obtaining real-time CSLI and have held such acquisition to amount to a 
                                                                                                                           
upon probable cause,” except in situations involving an emergency, locating a stolen device, in-
formed consent, judicially recognized warrant exceptions, or voluntary public disclosure). 
 135 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(c)(1)–(2) (West 2016) (providing that “[a] government 
entity may access electronic device information by means of . . . electronic communication with 
the device” pursuant to a warrant or wiretap order); see also SB 178 Fact Sheet, AM. C.L. UNION 
OF NORTHERN CAL., https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/SB%20178%20CalECPA%20
Fact%20Sheet_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/63HR-H5T9] (noting that “[l]aw enforcement is increas-
ingly taking advantage of outdated privacy laws to turn mobile phones into tracking devices” and 
that, in response, “SB 178 heeds the call in Jones for the legislature to balance privacy and public 
safety”); Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8, 
2015, 9:58 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/85YU-LKYF] (“The law places California not only at the forefront of protecting 
digital privacy among states, it outpaces even the federal government, where such efforts have 
stalled.”). The warrant-or-court-order requirement does not apply in circumstances involving con-
sent, an emergency, or loss of the device. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(c)(3)–(6). 
 136 See Tim Cushing, Supreme Court Turns Down Opportunity to Straighten out Cell Site Loca-
tion Information Mess, TECHDIRT (Nov. 13, 2015, 12:48 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20151113/06185532808/supreme-court-turns-down-opportunity-to-straighten-out-cell-site-location-
information-mess.shtml [https://perma.cc/LL24-XWFL] (providing a map to show the jurisdic-
tional jigsaw that persists following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision to deny certiorari in 
United States v. Davis, an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case concerning government acquisi-
tion of historical CSLI); see also Meyer, supra note 83 (noting the circuit split on the warrantless 
acquisition of CSLI); Abigail Tracy, While the Supreme Court Hesitates on Warrantless Cell 
Location Data Collection, Your Privacy Remains at Risk, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/10/16/while-the-supreme-court-hesitates-on-warrantless-
cell-location-data-collection-your-privacy-remains-at-risk/#109274993056 [http://perma.cc/586M-
L9JB] (quoting David Markus, attorney for the defendant in Davis, as snoting that “[j]udges, po-
lice officers and lawyers are all in limbo”). Compare Davis, 785 F.3d at 531 (holding that the 
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location records held by his 
cellular provider, which were subject to the third-party doctrine), with Commonwealth v. Augus-
tine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 864 (Mass. 2014) (holding that the Massachusetts Constitution requires the 
government to obtain a warrant prior to obtaining historical CSLI). 
 137 See, e.g., Davis, 785 F.3d at 531 (holding that government acquisition of historical CSLI 
does not amount to a Fourth Amendment search and does not require a warrant); In re Application 
of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013) (same); In re Applica-
tion of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to 
Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. CR 1:07
CR0023MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (same); Perry, 776 S.E.2d 
at 536. But see Augustine, 4 N.E.3d at 867 (holding that the Massachusetts Constitution requires 
that law enforcement obtain a warrant prior to obtaining an individual’s historical CSLI). 
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Fourth Amendment search.138 In the limited number of cases involving 
Stingray or similar technology, the courts have not been tasked with Fourth 
Amendment analysis because the government has conceded that such inter-
ception amounts to a search.139 
III. DIRTBOX LOCATION TRACKING IS A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH 
This Part argues that Dirtbox location monitoring implicates the Fourth 
Amendment and therefore the government must be required to get a warrant 
before using this technology.140 Section A contends that Dirtbox surveil-
lance violates its targets’ reasonable expectation of privacy and, therefore, 
amounts to a Fourth Amendment search.141 Section B asserts that although 
the policy guidance promulgated by the DOJ is a step in the right direction, 
Congress needs to pass legislation to ensure that individuals maintain an 
enforceable right to locational privacy.142 
A. The Dirtbox Conducts Fourth Amendment Searches 
Though often invoked to shield government surveillance from the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the third-party doctrine does not 
apply to Dirtbox surveillance.143 First, Dirtbox surveillance is accomplished 
through government interception, rather than cooperation of a third party.144 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never extended the third-party doctrine to 
government interception of information that was merely intended for a third 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location, 849 
F. Supp. 2d at 541–42 (holding that the acquisition of real-time CSLI amounts to a Fourth 
Amendment search and requires a warrant); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) 
(same); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (same, but under the New Jersey Constitu-
tion). 
 139 See, e.g., State v. Tate, 849 N.W. 2d 798, 805 (Wis. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1166 
(2015) (mem.) (noting that the State had conceded that the acquisition of cell-site location infor-
mation was a search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-
PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *15 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (noting the government’s stipula-
tion that operation of the Stingray amounted to a Fourth Amendment search and seizure). 
 140 See infra notes 143–186 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra notes 143–165 and accompanying text. 
 142 See infra notes 166–186 and accompanying text. 
 143 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (noting that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect information that one knowingly shares with the public); see also Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (holding that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to 
numbers dialed on a telephone); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding that 
government acquisition of an individual’s bank records does not constitute a search). 
 144 See Barrett, supra note 2 (describing how Dirtbox surveillance circumvents cellular pro-
viders as intermediaries, allowing the government to take information directly instead of request-
ing it from a third party). 
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party—every case has involved a cooperative intermediary.145 With no third 
party involved, the third-party doctrine is simply inapplicable.146  
Second, even if the third-party doctrine were applicable, a cell phone 
user’s disclosure of location data is not voluntary in the sense contemplated 
by the third-party doctrine cases.147 To forgo cell phone use is to remove 
oneself completely from modern society.148 Furthermore, location infor-
mation is more private than the typical transactional records covered by the 
third-party doctrine.149 Lower courts have signaled that real-time location 
data is not a typical business record and that its acquisition amounts to a 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, 
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.” (emphasis added)). Com-
pare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (applying the third-party doctrine where 
police officers obtained defendants’ garbage bags from the trash collector), with State v. Gallo-
way, 109 P.3d 383, 388 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (declining to apply the third-party doctrine where 
police searched through garbage before it could be gathered by the trash collector). 
 146 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment allows the government 
to obtain information conveyed to it by third parties); Brief of Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5, Maryland v. Andrews, No. 1496, 2015 WL 9907162, at 
*5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellees] (contrasting Smith, 
where dialed phone numbers where transmitted through the phone company’s network, with the 
Baltimore Police Department’s direct interaction with the defendant’s cell phone); see also Riley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014) (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46) (differentiating 
between the government’s data collection in Smith, which was conducted on the premises of the 
telephone company, and police officers’ direct interaction with the defendant’s cell phone in Ri-
ley). Ensuring that the third-party doctrine apply only to situations involving a third party will 
afford greater protection to individual privacy, as third-party cooperation provides a check on 
largely unfettered government interception. See Going Dark, supra note 93 (describing how cellu-
lar providers often delay their response to or entirely refuse to comply with court orders). 
 147 See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641 (N.J. 2013) (noting that cell phone users do not actu-
ally provide their location information to cell phone companies voluntarily because it can only be 
avoided by eschewing cell phone use entirely); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (“[U]nless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or 
professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 
451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business 
firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to partici-
pate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”). 
 148 See Andrea Caumont, Americans Increasingly View the Internet, Cellphones as Essential, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/27/americans-
increasingly-view-the-internet-cellphones-as-essential/ [https://perma.cc/2KV8-Z3F2] (showing that 
49% of American cell phone owners would have a hard time giving them up); see also Riley, 134 
S. Ct. at 2484 (describing cell phones as “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the 
proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy”). 
 149 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT TELEPHONE INVESTIGATIONS RE-
SOURCE GUIDE: CELLULAR, SATELLITE & VOIP PHONE PROVIDERS 6 (2010), https://www.aclu.
org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra_irvine4_irvineca.pdf [http://perma.cc/7HQH-
TEY6] (outlining a hierarchy of protected information under the Fourth Amendment, where trans-
actional records are the least protected, telephone conversations the most, and location information 
directly in the middle). 
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search.150 IMSI catchers, like the Stingray and Dirtbox, acquire triangulated 
location information, which is even more accurate than real-time CSLI.151 
Indeed, in the few cases in which the government has been forthright about 
using the Stingray, the government has conceded that the interception of 
location information amounts to a search.152 The Dirtbox, which functions 
as a high-powered Stingray, intercepts location data that is accurate within 
ten feet.153 Such accuracy allows the government to view the dreaded “mo-
saic” of one’s life, from the most mundane to the most personal of activi-
ties.154 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. (Sealed), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. 
2005) (requiring that the government obtain a warrant based on probable cause in all future cases 
in which it seeks to obtain an individual’s real-time cell-site location information); Tracey v. State, 
152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (holding that the government conducted a Fourth Amendment 
search when it tracked the defendant’s cell phone location in real time); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 149 (adopting a warrant requirement for the Department’s use of cell-site simulators, 
which intercept real-time cellular location information). 
 151 See Barrett, supra note 2 (noting that the Dirtbox can “pinpoint [a target’s] location within 
about 10 feet, down to a specific room in a building”); see also In re Application of U.S. for an 
Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 
574 (D. Md. 2011) (describing how real-time location information has the potential to be triangu-
lated for greater accuracy); Interview with Nathan Freed Wessler, supra note 90 (explaining that 
real-time CSLI provides more precise tracking than historical CSLI because the former can be 
triangulated). But see Pell & Soghoian, supra note 90 (noting that certain cellular providers regu-
larly record triangulated CSLI, although it is not common practice to do so). 
 152 See, e.g., State v. Tate, 849 N.W. 2d 798, 805 (Wis. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1166 
(2015) (mem.) (noting that the State of Wisconsin had conceded that the use of a Stingray 
amounted to a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-
DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *15 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (acknowledging the government’s stipu-
lation that the Stingray operation constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment). 
 153 See Barrett, supra note 2 (describing how the Dirtbox can “pinpoint [a target’s] location 
within about 10 feet, down to a specific room in a building”); Memorandum from Stephen W. 
Miko, Res. Manager, Anchorage Police Dep’t, to Bart Mauldin, Purchasing Officer, Anchorage 
Police Dep’t (June 24, 2009), http://files.cloudprivacy.net/anchorage-pd-harris-memo.pdf (noting 
that a portable KingFish cell-site simulator can identify the location of a cellular device within 
twenty-five feet); see also Ali Winston, Chicago and Los Angeles Have Used ‘Dirt Box’ Surveil-
lance for a Decade, REVEAL NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.revealnews.org/article/chicago-and-
los-angeles-have-used-dirt-box-surveillance-for-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/QX2U-B53B] (charac-
terizing Dirtboxes as “a more powerful class of cell-site simulator than the more widely used 
Stingray”). 
 154 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (ex-
pressing concern about long-term monitoring, which “generates a precise, comprehensive record 
of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, profes-
sional, religious, and sexual associations”); Kerr, supra note 70, at 315 (describing how a mosaic 
theory analysis considers a series of government acts together, rather than examining them in 
isolation); see also Barrett, supra note 2 (describing how Dirtbox surveillance flights occur regu-
larly). 
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Dirtbox surveillance amounts to a search because it gathers location 
information from within private residences.155 Considering the frequency 
and remarkable accuracy of Dirtbox data collection, it is very likely that this 
surveillance acquires location information from individuals inside their 
homes, a constitutionally protected space.156 Although it is possible that a 
single instance of Dirtbox tracking could pinpoint an individual in a consti-
tutionally unprotected space, the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly forbid-
den this Russian roulette approach.157 Dirtbox surveillance, therefore, vio-
lates the most inviolable—privacy in the home.158 
The mosaic theory, though developed in response to continuous GPS 
tracking, could reasonably be extended to cover continual cell phone loca-
                                                                                                                           
 155 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that the acquisition by sense-
enhancing technology of information about the inside of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
search); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (holding that the government is not ex-
empt from the warrant requirement when it uses an electronic device to determine whether an item 
or person is inside of an individual’s home). A “mere visual enhancement” argument by the gov-
ernment under Knotts would be trumped by the in-home privacy holdings of Kyllo and Karo, as 
discussed in this section. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Karo, 468 U.S. at 716. 
 156 See Barrett, supra note 2 (explaining how the Dirtbox enables law enforcement to gather 
data from “tens of thousands of cellphones in a single flight, collecting their identifying infor-
mation and general location”); see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY—TIME USE ON AN AVERAGE WORK DAY FOR EMPLOYED PER-
SONS AGES 25 TO 54 WITH CHILDREN (2013), http://www.bls.gov/tus/charts/ [http://perma.cc/
H5DY-4YDQ] (revealing that the average employed person between ages twenty-five and fifty-
four with children spends at least 8.8 hours at home on a given work day); Paul Tadich, I Spy with 
My Little “Dirtbox”: How The U.S Government Surveils Cellphones, SPUTNIK (Nov. 15, 2014, 
12:33PM), http://us.sputniknews.com/us/20141115/1013225346.html [https://perma.cc/3LC5-
CSBK] (describing how the DOJ uses the Dirtbox to first isolate the target cell phone, then pin-
point the target within ten feet). The Dirtbox surveillance program signals that it is time for the 
Court to address the constitutionality of large-scale cell phone location tracking. See United States 
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices as re-
spondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether 
different constitutional principles may be applicable.”). 
 157 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38–39 (holding it impractical in application to prohibit only thermal 
imaging of “intimate details” because police could not know in advance what through-the-wall 
surveillance might detect); Karo, 468 U.S. at 716 (determining that the government could not use 
an electronic device to determine whether a person or item was inside a residence at a certain time 
without being subjected to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment); see also Tracey, 152 So. 
3d at 518 (explaining that law enforcement has no way of knowing if a suspect will be inside of a 
constitutionally protected space when they acquire real-time CSLI); Earls, 214 N.J. at 586 (noting 
that “law enforcement had no way of knowing in advance whether defendant’s cell phone was 
being monitored in a public or private space”). 
 158 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that the acquisition by sense-enhancing technology of 
information about the inside of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); Karo, 468 U.S. 
at 716 (holding that the government is not exempt from the warrant requirement when it uses an 
electronic device to determine whether an item or person is inside of an individual’s home); see 
also Brief for the Appellees, supra note 146, at 5 (“By pinpointing suspects and third parties while 
they are inside constitutionally protected spaces, cell site simulators invade reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy.”).  
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tion monitoring.159 The idea behind the mosaic theory is that prolonged sur-
veillance reveals intimate details about a person’s life that would not be dis-
closed under short-term surveillance.160 A similarly intimate picture would 
be revealed through continual Dirtbox monitoring, regardless of the brevity 
of each instance of surveillance.161 Although the mosaic theory is not yet 
law, a majority of the Court has expressed concern about the same kind of 
pattern-tracking surveillance that may be carried out under the Dirtbox pro-
gram.162 
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jones, it avoided the now-
pressing issue of cell phone location tracking that is free from physical at-
tachment.163 When next presented with the opportunity, the Court must 
acknowledge that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
cell phone location interception.164 To do so would be to acknowledge that 
privacy protections must evolve along with the technology that threatens 
them, and to embrace the reasonable expectation of privacy standard out-
lined in the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United States, which allows for 
this evolution.165 
B. Congress Must Enact a Warrant Requirement 
Although the DOJ policy memo is an encouraging step in transparency 
and regulation of cell-site simulators, it does not adequately protect the pri-
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (endorsing some form of the mosaic 
approach); Kerr, supra note 70, at 320–21 (noting that a majority of the Court is prepared to em-
brace the mosaic theory); Slobogin, supra note 65, at 7 (observing that five Justices appear ready 
to decouple physical trespass from the Fourth Amendment). 
 160 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining how pro-
longed surveillance reveals habits and is therefore more intrusive than short-term surveillance), 
aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., con-
curring) (applying the mosaic theory to continuous GPS tracking over a twenty-eight-day period). 
 161 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64; see also Barrett, supra note 2 (revealing that Dirtbox flights 
occur regularly). Continual Dirtbox surveillance may represent an even greater intrusion than the 
vehicle-mounted GPS tracking in Jones because it targets cell phones, which are carried by individu-
als into constitutionally protected spaces. See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 861 
(Mass. 2014) (citing United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“There 
are practical limits on where a GPS tracking device attached a person’s vehicle may go. A cell phone, 
on the other hand, is usually carried with a person wherever they go.”). 
 162 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (endorsing some form of mosaic 
theory); id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (same); see also Barrett, supra note 2 (describing how 
Dirtbox surveillance flights occur regularly). 
 163 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (predicting that the majority’s reliance 
on the trespass doctrine will present courts with frustrating issues in cases involving non-physical, 
electronic surveillance). 
 164 Id. 
 165 See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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vacy rights of individuals targeted for Dirtbox surveillance.166 First, the 
memo provides a broad carve-out from its warrant mandate.167 Second, the 
policy only applies to DOJ agents.168 Finally, the memo consists entirely of 
unenforceable policy guidelines.169 
The exceptional circumstances carve-out significantly undercuts the 
warrant rule.170 Specifically, agents may deploy cell-cite simulators subject 
only to internal approval where it is impracticable to obtain a warrant.171 
The memo, however, provides neither an explanation nor examples of the 
situations in which it would be impracticable to get a warrant.172 This ex-
ception is so vague that it creates a nearly explicit loophole for the DOJ to 
conduct warrantless cell-site location monitoring at any time.173 It is little 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103; ACLU Comment, supra note 114 (recog-
nizing the DOJ guidelines as commendable but insufficient); Johnson, supra note 124 (quoting 
Senator Patrick Leahy, D-VT, who lauded the DOJ’s announcement of its new cell-site simulator 
policy but expressed “serious questions about the exceptions to the warrant requirement”); Faiza 
Patel, DOJ’s New Stingray Policy Is a Good Start, but It’s Got Problems, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST. (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/dojs-new-stingray-policy-good-start-
its-got-problems [http://perma.cc/X2LG-V8PK] (lauding the DOJ’s policy guidance as a “good 
first step,” but indicating its shortcomings). 
 167 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 3–5 (laying out two exceptions to the 
Department’s new warrant rule); ACLU Comment, supra note 114 (advocating that the DOJ close 
loopholes left in its newly adopted warrant requirement); Johnson, supra note 124 (noting Senator 
Leahy’s concern about the DOJ’s warrant exceptions). 
 168 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 6 (limiting the applicability of the 
guidelines to agents of the DOJ); ACLU Comment, supra note 114 (advocating that the DOJ ex-
tend its policy to cover the use of cell-site simulators by state and local law enforcement, which 
use federal funding to purchase the devices). 
 169 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 2 n.2 (clarifying that the policy memo 
sets forth nothing more than internal policy guidance and does not create any enforceable rights). 
 170 See id. at 3–5; ACLU Comment, supra note 114 (advocating that the DOJ close loopholes 
left in its newly adopted warrant requirement); Johnson, supra note 124 (noting Senator Leahy’s 
concern about the DOJ’s warrant exceptions). 
 171 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 4–5 (setting forth the exceptional 
circumstances warrant exception); Patel, supra note 166 (indicating that the exceptional circum-
stances carve-out permits the agency to utilize cell-site simulators whenever it believes that ob-
taining a warrant would be impracticable). In contrast to the exceptional circumstances carve-out, 
the exigent circumstances exception is reasonable because it permits warrantless operation of a cell-
site simulator where there exists a threat to human life or the administration of justice. See DOJ Cell-
Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 3–4 (noting that exigent circumstances include the need to 
protect against serious harm to human life, prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, pursue a 
fleeing criminal, and prevent the escape of a fugitive suspect or convict). 
 172 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 4 (providing that no search warrant 
will be required under circumstances where obtaining one would be “impracticable”); Patel, supra 
note 166 (noting that the policy does not provide examples of circumstances where it might be 
impracticable to obtain a warrant). 
 173 See Johnson, supra note 124 (noting the concern of ACLU attorney Nathan Freed Wessler 
that undefined “exceptional circumstances” leave the door open to warrantless use of cell-site 
simulators); Patel, supra note 166 (highlighting the vagueness of the exceptional circumstances 
carve-out). 
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consolation that the DOJ expects this exception to be invoked in a limited 
number of cases.174 
Furthermore, the guidelines only apply to DOJ agents.175 But the DOJ 
is not the only federal agency that uses cell-site simulators.176 Of greater 
concern, this military-grade surveillance technology is now routinely being 
used by state and local law enforcement.177 With the help of federal anti-
terror grants, local police forces obtain this powerful technology and deploy 
it for routine investigations.178 
Finally, the policy memo is toothless—it consists of unenforceable 
guidelines.179 In a single footnote, the DOJ clarified that the guidelines are 
meant to improve internal management and provide no legal rights or reme-
                                                                                                                           
 174 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 4 (expecting exceptional circumstanc-
es to be “very limited”); see also Patel, supra note 166 (noting that the policy provides no exam-
ples of “exceptional circumstances” other than forecasting that they will be “very limited”). 
 175 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 6 (“This policy applies to all instances 
in which Department components use cell-site simulators in support of other Federal agencies 
and/or State and Local law enforcement agencies.”); Patel, supra note 166 (interpreting the policy 
as being completely inapplicable to state and local police). Although the DOJ memo does not 
govern the use of cell-site simulators by state and local law enforcement, the language of the poli-
cy is ambiguous enough to lead some to believe otherwise. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 124 
(“The new policy applies to federal agents under Justice Department control and to state or local 
investigators who work on federal task forces.” (emphasis added)). 
 176 Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 95 (listing thirteen federal 
agencies, some outside of the DOJ, that are known to be using cell-site simulators); Nicky Woolf 
& William Green, IRS Possessed Stingray Cellphone Surveillance Gear, Documents Reveal, The 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/26/stingray-surveillance-
technology-irs-cellphone-tower [http://perma.cc/5TQ7-UC2K] (detailing how the Internal Reve-
nue Service is among the federal agencies using cell-site simulators). 
 177 See Cagle, supra note 1 (describing how local law enforcement in Anaheim have spent 
nearly a decade developing an inventory of powerful cell phone location monitoring devices); 
Ferner, supra note 1 (noting that police in Anaheim, California use the Dirtbox); Winston, supra 
note 153 (detailing the use of Dirtboxes by the Los Angeles and Chicago police departments); see 
also Patel, supra note 166 (arguing that the policy leaves open a “huge gap” by failing to confront 
the use of cell-site simulators by state and local law enforcement); Stingray Tracking Devices: 
Who’s Got Them?, supra note 95 (displaying a map and table revealing the pervasive use of cell-
site simulators by both state and local law enforcement across the United States). 
 178 Cagle, supra note 109 (detailing how the Anaheim police used a federal grant to purchase 
a Dirtbox); Patel, supra note 166 (contending that although the DOJ may be reluctant to extend 
the new warrant requirement to police departments, it could attach some conditions to the devices 
that it provides and finances); Nathan Freed Wessler, Police Citing “Terrorism” to Buy Stingrays 
Used Only for Ordinary Crimes, AM. C.L. UNION: FREE FUTURE (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/police-citing-terrorism-buy-stingrays-used-only-ordinary-
crimes [https://perma.cc/4ZVE-SGV2] (describing how the state police department in Michigan 
“justified its initial purchase of the surveillance gear as ‘vital to the war on terrorism’” but used 
the technology “in 128 run-of-the-mill investigations last year—not a single one of which was for 
terrorism”). 
 179 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 2 n.2 (clarifying that the policy memo 
sets forth internal guidelines, not law); Patel, supra note 166 (noting that the warrant requirement 
“is being implemented ‘as a matter of policy’—i.e., not as a matter of law”). 
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dies.180 Therefore, even if a defendant could prove that the DOJ had violat-
ed its own rules and obtained incriminating evidence through warrantless 
Dirtbox surveillance, these guidelines would not necessarily compel a court 
to suppress that evidence.181 Because suppression is the primary means to 
deter law enforcement from evading a warrant requirement, absent judicial 
or legislative mandate, the DOJ’s warrant rule will have little deterrent ef-
fect.182 
Until the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that individuals have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their cellular location information, Con-
gress should pass legislation requiring the government to obtain a warrant 
before using the Dirtbox and any other cell-site simulator.183 As proposed 
by Representative Jason Chaffetz, Congress should go beyond the scope of 
the DOJ memo by requiring all law enforcement—whether federal, state, or 
local—to obtain a warrant before operating a cell-site simulator.184 Unlike 
Representative Chaffetz’ proposal and the DOJ memo, however, Congress 
should reject the unspecified “exigent circumstances” loophole and should 
exempt law enforcement from the warrant requirement in emergency situa-
tions only.185 In the meantime, states should continue to push ahead of the 
federal government on locational privacy protection.186 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 2 n.2 (stipulating that the policy serves 
internal management purposes only and “is not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, 
trust, or responsibility, whether substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity” and does 
not “create any right of review in an administrative, judicial, or any other proceeding” (emphasis 
added)). 
181 See id. 
182 See id.; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (describing the essential deter-
rent function served by the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule). 
 183 See ACLU Comment, supra note 166 (analyzing the inadequacies of the DOJ policy memo 
and concluding that Congress should pass comprehensive legislation to protect individuals’ priva-
cy from encroachments by cell-site simulators and other tracking technology). 
 184 See Cell-Site Simulator Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposing an expan-
sion and codification of the DOJ memo). 
 185 See id.; DOJ Cell-Site Policy Memo, supra note 103, at 4–5. 
 186 See Andy Greenberg, Congress Has a Thing or Two to Learn from These State Privacy 
Laws, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Jan. 26, 2016, 2:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/
2016/01/26/electronic_communications_privacy_act_is_due_for_an_upgrade.html [https://perma.
cc/VHU7-Z4LL] (noting that various states have introduced legislation to impose a warrant re-
quirement on Stingrays, and that Nebraska has drafted a law that would ban the devices entirely); 
see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-12(a) (2015) (prohibiting law enforcement from using real-
time cellular tracking devices without first obtaining “an order issued by a court based upon a 
finding of probable cause,” unless exigent circumstances exist); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42, subd. 
2(a) (2014) (providing that “a government entity may not obtain the location information of an 
electronic device without a tracking warrant,” except in situations of lost or stolen devices, emer-
gency, or informed consent); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-610(b) (2014) (providing that “no gov-
ernmental entity shall obtain the location information of an electronic device without a search 
warrant issued by a duly authorized court,” except in circumstances of a stolen device, an emer-
gency, affirmative consent, a user posting his location on social media, or exigency); UTAH CODE 
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CONCLUSION 
The use of Dirtbox technology by law enforcement to intercept indi-
viduals’ cell phone location data, without judicial or legislative oversight, 
poses a significant problem. Because surveillance by cell-site simulators 
violates society’s reasonable expectation of privacy, these devices implicate 
the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment. The cell-site simulator 
guidelines issued by the Department of Justice represent an encouraging 
step in transparency and privacy protection, but the warrant mandate is lim-
ited. Across the country, state legislatures have begun imposing restrictions 
on the use of cell-site simulators. But the current patchwork of inconsistent 
laws and unenforceable guidelines indicates that more comprehensive pro-
tection is needed. Until the U.S. Supreme Court accepts the opportunity to 
bring the Fourth Amendment into the twenty-first century, Congress must 
enact a warrant law to ensure that privacy protection keeps pace with sur-
veillance technology. 
JONATHAN BARD 
                                                                                                                           
ANN. § 77-23c-102(1)(a), (2)(a) (West 2014) (providing that “a government entity may not obtain 
the location information . . . of an electronic device without a search warrant issued by a court 
upon probable cause,” except in situations involving an emergency, locating a stolen device, in-
formed consent, judicially recognized warrant exceptions, or voluntary public disclosure). 
